Ukraine’s electors look back to the east

Ukraine’s early parliamentary elections, at the end of this month, reflect a country still coming to terms with its unexpected statehood achieved in 1991. Since independence, Ukraine, which means “borderland”, has become a focal point for geopolitical strategists in both Moscow and Western capitals – specifically Washington. With relations between Russia and the West at an all time low since the end of the Cold War, this Ukraine rivalry has the potential of deteriorating into a serious flashpoint. For the West, Ukraine’s independence from Moscow signified the end of a long and painful struggle against an imperial power. However, the failure of the “Orange Revolution” suggests that this version of events is unsound and does not take into account the closeness of Ukraine with its fraternal neighbour to the east.

Many Western commentators viewed the Soviet Union as a “prison of peoples”. But history can be distorted to justify the geopolitical ambitions of governments which have interests in a certain area. The truth is that only two regions of the former Soviet Union never wanted to be a part of it – the Baltic states and the Galicia region in Ukraine. In the case of the latter, 70.5 per cent of Ukrainians (in a turnout of 80.2 per cent) voted to preserve the Soviet Union in a referendum called by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1991. Nonetheless, since the emergence of an independent Ukraine, the United States has come to view this former Soviet republic as significant in helping to preserve American global hegemony. As the former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said: “Ukraine, a new and important space on the European chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”

The Ukrainian presidential election of 2004 was an opportunity for the West to try and repeat the success it had achieved in Serbia in 2000 when the incumbent President Slobodan Milosevic was defeated. By covertly funding Viktor Yushchenko’s camp, the Americans’ objective was to help install a pro-Western government in Kiev that would steer Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit. Although Yushchenko did gain power, his pro-Western agenda has proved to be an abject failure. Western politicians and commentators referred to his victory as the “Orange Revolution” and implied that Ukrainians had taken a conscious decision to distance themselves from Russia and embrace the West. This view failed to take into account the historic relationship between Ukrainians and Russians and how interwoven are the economies of their two countries.

Most Ukrainians do not view Russia as an alien country. Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, was the birthplace of the first Russian state, Kievan Rus. Nikolai Gogol, the famous Ukrainian writer, and George Vernadsky, the Ukrainian historian, both wrote in Russian and regarded themselves as Russian. Most Ukrainians are close to Russians in terms of culture, behaviour, outlook and language. This then translates into military and economic affairs. The Russian officer corps is approximately 30 per cent Ukrainian, while the Ukrainian army is made up of roughly the same amount of Russians. It is thought that half of the personnel of the Security Service of Ukraine (SUB) still look to Moscow for leadership. The Ukrainian and Russian economies are extremely interdependent. It is estimated that 60 per cent of Ukrainian businesses are dependent on Russian capital, while Ukraine’s main exporter remains Russia. Kremlin-backed businessmen and Ukrainian businessmen work closely together and are determined to maintain their dominance over the Ukrainian economy in the face of outsiders. It is these links that explain why Yushchenko’s pro-western drive quickly diminished.

There is a misconception in the West that Ukraine is politically divided along the river Dniepr into western Ukraine, which is orientated towards the West, and eastern Ukraine, which looks towards Russia. This is a dangerous conviction and encourages Western governments to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs which can only lead to confrontation with Russia.

In fact, anti-Russian sentiments exist principally in the region of Galicia. Ukrainian national consciousness is largely confined to here and these Ukrainians are culturally and linguistically different from the rest of the Ukrainian population. This is because Galicia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918, and then Poland up until 1939, before being annexed by the Soviet Union.

According to recent opinion polls, most Ukrainians are opposed to President Yushchenko’s pro-Western objectives. In a recent poll carried out by the Ukrainian Centre for Sociological and Marketing Research (SOCIUM), 63.7 per cent of respondents thought Yushchenko should be impeached, while 55.4 per cent took the view that the consequences of the “Orange Revolution” were negative (against 11.4 per cent). Polls have also shown that only 20 per cent of Ukrainians support Yushchenko’s idea of Ukraine joining Nato. Last year, a planned military exercise (Operation Sea Breeze) between Ukrainian, US and other Nato member warships and marines off the coast of Feodosiya, Crimea, had to be cancelled because of large-scale protests from the local community.

Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych’s party, the Party of Regions, is expected to win the elections to the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada. In one recent poll, 33.3 per cent of respondents said they fully trusted Yanukovych, while only 10.6 per cent and 8.2 per cent trust Yuliya Tymoshenko (leader of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Electoral Bloc) and Yushchenko, respectively.

Yanukovych’s defeat in the 2004 presidential election was not a demonstration of anti-Russian feelings and a desire for Ukraine to be subsumed into the West. Some voters did not consider him a suitable President, while others opposed Vladimir Putin’s involvement in the election campaign. However, Yanukovych will be a strong contender to win next year’s presidential election because he is in touch with what a large proportion of the Ukrainian population regard as important: maintaining close and friendly relations with Russia (especially in the economic sphere), making Russian a second official language and keeping Ukraine out of Nato.

The West must appreciate Ukraine’s historic closeness to Russia and realise that many Ukrainians consider themselves members of the East Slavic group, composed of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. A refusal by the West, in particular Washington, to accept this while pressing ahead with plans for Ukraine joining Nato will cause deep resentment among the Ukrainian population and, more importantly, provoke the ire of a resurgent Russia which will, under no circumstances, tolerate Nato on its southern border.